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ABStRACt: André Gallois argues that individuals that undergo fission are on some oc-
casions identical, but on others distinct . occasional identity however, is metaphysi-
cally costly . i argue that we can get all the benefits of occasional identity without the 
metaphysical costs . on the proposed account, the names of ordinary material objects 
refer indeterminately to stages that belong to reference classes determined by the 
context of utterance or temporal adverbs . in addition, temporal markers indicating 
the perspective from which we count objects and assign properties to them determine 
how many count and what is true of them . So, as Gallois holds, the truth value of 
claims about what is true at a time may change over time and, where fission or fusion 
occur, does change . the current account, however, secures this result without com-
mitment to occasional identity: reference, predication and counting are “occasional”; 
identity is not .
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André Gallois (1999) argues that individuals that undergo fission are on some 
occasions identical but at others distinct . However, while occasional identity 
makes sense of fission cases it is metaphysically costly . i argue that we can get 
all the benefits of occasional identity without the metaphysical costs: refer-
ence, predication and counting are “occasional”; identity is not .
1. Amoebas
At t1, AMoEBA is in a pond about to undergo fission; at t2, after fission, one 
daughter amoeba, SliDE, is on a microscope slide while the other, PoND, 
is in the ancestral pond . What shall we say about SliDE and PoND? 
Agreed: at t2, SliDE is in the lab on a slide while PoND is the pond . let 
us grant, further, that AMoEBA survives as SliDE and PoND, so that 
each is AMoEBA, the individual in the pond at t1 . SliDE and PoND are 
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therefore identical at t1 . Since they are identical at t1, they must have the 
same properties at t1 . At t1 PoND is going to be in the pond at t2 so SliDE 
is going to be in the pond at t2 also . But at t2 SliDE is on a slide and, once 
fission occurs, she is not going to be in the pond at t2 . So there appears to be 
a contradiction:
(1) SliDE is going to be in the pond at t2.
and
(2) SliDE is not going to be in the pond at t2 .
there are various ways to avoid contradiction . one way is to ignore 
properties that an individual has at a time in virtue of states of affairs that ob-
tain at other times, so that sentences that purport to ascribe such properties 
to individuals are without truth value . on this account neither (1) nor (2) is 
true – or false . this is however an unattractive solution: very few properties 
assigned to ordinary, persisting material objects are instantaneous time-slice 
properties . Alternatively, we can reject the assumption that AMoEBA sur-
vives as SliDE and PoND . Understood in this way, fission does not occur: 
AMoEBA is replaced by her daughter amoebas .1 this is not however an at-
tractive option in the case of personal fission, which is to be considered .
1.1. Occasional identity
Gallois has proposed that where fission occurs, identity holds temporarily on 
the individuals involved . At t1, there is just one amoeba in the pond, viz . 
AMoEBA (a .k .a . SliDE, a .k .a . PoND): SliDE = PoND . At t2, there are 
two amoebas – one in the lab, the other in the pond: SliDE ≠ PoND . on 
Gallois’s account, SliDE and PoND do not merely share stages before fis-
sion: they are strictly identical . When we count the individuals around at any 
given time we count by strict identity – not by “tensed identity”2 or some 
other relation . Strict identity is, however, occasional: there was one amoeba 
before fission – two afterwards .
1 When considering the prospects of amoebas, first-person-perspectival concerns don’t 
cloud our intuitions . this solution is nevertheless problematic even apart from such concerns . 
Suppose that instead of undergoing fission, AMoEBE loses half of her cytoplasm but sub-
sequently recovers, grows back to normal amoebic proportions and, at t2 finds herself on a 
microscope slide . in this scenario, intuitively, AMoEBA survives – as SliDE . (Humans, after 
all, can survive the loss of half their body weight and the all but inevitable weight gain that 
follows) . But then we are hard pressed to claim that where PoND does survive, SliDE is not 
AMoEBA . intuitively, identity is intrinsically grounded if it is grounded at all: AMoEBA’S 
survival as SliDE should not depend upon non-accompaniment by PoND . While our intui-
tions are not decisive, it may be worthwhile to consider alternatives .
2 the relation that holds on individuals when they share stages .
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on this account, moreover, time-indexed properties generally are occa-
sional – that is to say, an individual may have a property P-at-t at some time, 
t1 but fail to have P-at-t at another time, t2. And so it is with individuals that 
undergo fission . At t2 and all other post-fission times, SliDE is not in-the-
pond-at-t2 but, before fission, at t1 SliDE is in-the-pond-at-t2 . this is as it 
must be if we admit time-indexed properties and understand the relation that 
holds on fission-survivors before fission as strict identity . PoND is in the 
pond at t2 so, at t1, she is going to be in the pond at t2 . Since SliDE is strictly 
identical to PoND before fission, at t1 the same will be true of SliDE . oc-
casional identity requires that time-indexed properties be occasional .
this is a point in the theory’s favor: where fission occurs, we do intui-
tively want to say that different things are true of individuals at the same time 
from different temporal perspectives . the following puzzle-case of personal fis-
sion pumps this intuition:
Jones, who subsequently undergoes fission, is in Duplication Center 
Room 100 on Monday at t1 . At t2, on tuesday, she (they?) is (are?) back 
in Room 100, in twin beds A and B whose occupants are baptized “Smith-
Jones” and “Brown-Jones” respectively .3
Enter a naïve subject . Asked on Monday how many people are in Room 
100 he confidently answers, “one” – even knowing that Jones is about to 
undergo duplication, a procedure he believes is safe and completely relia-
3 this, with only a slight tweek, is the story Perry (1972) tells .
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ble . on tuesday Naïve Subject is asked once again how many people are in 
Room 100 and answers with equal confidence, “two”: Smith-Jones in Bed A 
and Brown-Jones in Bed B . Smith-Jones and Brown-Jones each claim to be 
the person in Room 100 prior to duplication, and each has the appropriate 
(faux?) memories to support her claim . Naïve Subject believes both of them.
this is the gotcha moment! Philosopher reminds Naïve Subject that on 
Monday he held that there was just one person in room 100 but now, on 
tuesday, claims that there are two distinct people, each of whom was in Room 
100 on Monday – which is to say he holds that that there were two people in 
Room 100 on Monday . that, Philosopher says, is a contradiction: “there was 
exactly one person in Room 100 on Monday and there was not exactly one 
person in Room 100 on Monday” .
in what follows we shall see that Naïve Subject, whose intuitions are 
accommodated by Gallois’s account, is correct: on Monday, Smith-Jones = 
Brown-Jones on Monday but on tuesday Smith-Jones ≠ Brown-Jones on 
Monday . i argue, however, we can achieve this result without invoking oc-
casional identity .
1.2. A stage-theoretical alternative to occasional identity
the alternative i propose assumes the “stage view”, according to which or-
dinary material objects are instantaneous stages . on every stage-theoretical 
account names of such ordinary objects are systematically ambiguous – re-
ferring to different stages at different times or within different contexts . it 
is nevertheless controversial how reference is determined . According to the 
stage theory popularized by ted Sider (1996, 2001), the utterance of a name 
refers to the stage concurrent with the utterance if there is such a stage . Where 
there is no suitable current stage to serve as the referent, however, sentences 
that purport to be about individuals are to be understood as existential and 
general .4 on this account, so long as Socrates was going about his business, 
corrupting youth and hassling fellow Athenians, the sentence “Socrates is 
wise” (or its Greek counterpart) was a simple singular statement ascribing 
wisdom to the Socrates-stage concurrent with the time of utterance; once 
Socrates succumbed to the hemlock its underlying grammar changed to logi-
cal gobbledygook: WAS(x)(Sx & Wx) . Such an account is disconcertingly 
disjunctive .
4 “if i say ‘Clinton was once governor of Arkansas’, we may take this as having subject-
predicate form […] the sentence ‘Socrates was wise’ cannot be a de re temporal claim […] 
Syntactically, the sentence should be taken as the result of applying sentential operator ‘WAS’ 
to the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’; the resulting sentence means that at some point in the past, 
there is a Socrates-stage that is wise .” (Sider 1996: 450)
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Sider’s original rendition of the stage view is also disjunctive when comes 
to counting . Stage theories yield the intuitive correct count of individuals 
at any given time, counting synchronically, in both ordinary and branching 
cases: at any given time, t, there are as many individuals at t as there are stages 
at t . But the stage view makes counting the individuals around during non-
momentary time-intervals problematic . How many ships passed through the 
harbor during a 24-hour period? there were innumerable ship-stages – more 
than the intuitive number of ships . But no time-slice count during the period 
selects the intuitively correct number of ships that passed through the harbor 
during that period, since ships come and go . in response, Sider (1996: 448) 
proposes a “partial retreat”: when counting timelessly, worms rather than 
stages are to be counted .5
later iterations of the stage view have addressed both of these concerns . 
Sider himself has more recently endorsed a perspective theory according to 
which the context of a counting sentence determines the temporal bounda-
ries of the objects that count . “the response”, Sider (2009: 19) writes, “em-
ploys the notion of a perspective from which a sentence is uttered […] [which] 
determines the range of (unembedded] quantifiers, referents of names, and 
what objects satisfy ordinary predicates .”
While the introduction of perspective represents an improvement, argu-
ably, Sider’s revised theory is not sufficiently perspectival . We want a grand 
unified theory that treats the living and the dead equitably, counts the same 
kinds of things, viz . stages, whether counting synchronically or “timelessly” 
and which, finally, provides a rationale for assigning different time-indexed 
properties to individuals from different temporal perspectives – so that, e .g . at 
t1 SliDE is in the pond at t2 but at t2 SliDE is not in the pond at t2 . And that 
is what the account sketched in the following sections is intended to deliver .
2. Shifting reference
Prima facie, individuals that undergo fission are at time identical but at other 
times distinct . this appears to be a contradiction:
(3) At t1 SliDE = PoND
and
(4) At t2 SliDE ≠ PoND .
5 “if we take the ‘timeless perspective’ and ask how many people there ever will be, or 
how many people have been (say) sitting in my office during the last hour, the stage view seems 
not to have an easy answer . […] the stage view should be restricted to the claim that typical 
references to persons are to person stages . But […] when we take the timeless perspective, 
reference is to worms .” (Sider 1996: 448)
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But without either opting for occasional identity or dismissing this claim 
outright, stage theorists, who already recognize names as systematically am-
biguous, can provide an account of how reference shifts in fission cases so 
that there is no contradiction .
Prima facie, the stage view admits too many candidates for reference . 
if names refer to stages, talking about ordinary material objects poses the 
familiar problem of the many since continuum-many stages will answer to 
any name . in response, Sider suggests that in sentences like (5) we are talking 
about the stage concurrent with the time of utterance:
(5) obama is American .
Understood in this way, (5) says of obama-now that it is personal-counter-
part-related to a past born-in-America stage . Sider however rejects this read-
ing of sentences that purport to be about Socrates on the grounds that absent 
a current stage, the selection of any other stage would be arbitrary – hence 
his disjunctive account .
Contrary to Birther’s allegations, however, obama is now and always has 
been American, so regardless of which obama-stage we pick as the referent of 
“obama”, (5) will come out true: to that extent, it doesn’t matter which stage 
is selected as the referent . “often”, David lewis (1993: 172) remarks, “what 
you want to say will be true under all different ways of making the unmade 
decision” . We shall, therefore, adopt a supervaluationist account of reference 
and embrace indecision . on this account there is, for every admissible pre-
cisification, exactly one stage that “obama” selects from amongst a class of 
counterpart-interrelated stages . And, although it is indeterminate which one 
it is, it does not matter .
Unlike (5), however, some sentences, on their most natural reading, 
restrict reference-candidates to a range of stages indicated by temporal ad-
verbs:
(6) in 2008, obama lived in illinois .
Here, the reference-candidates for “obama” are, intuitively, just those 
obama-stages that occurred in 2008 . So, on the current supervaluationist 
account, the reference class of a name need not include all the counterpart-
related stages from which it selects . Consequently, names are temporally flex-
ible in two respects: first, the name of an individual refers indeterminately 
over a class of counterpart-interrelated stages; secondly, context and temporal 
adverbs select the class of stages to which a name indeterminately refers .
Since referring expressions are temporally flexible in this way we need to 
consider not only time at which properties are ascribed to an individual but 
also the time that selects the reference candidates . that will make a crucial 
difference to the truth value of sentences like (7), which is ambiguous:
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(7) in 2008, the President lived in illinois .
On one reading (7) directs us to 2008 Obama-stages; on another to 2008 
Bush-stages. (7′) is true, but (7′′) is false:
(7′) The 2015 president lived in Illinois in 2008.
(7′′) The 2008 president lived in Illinois in 2008.
From any temporal perspective, a sentence of the form, “N has P at t”, is 
true just in case the set of candidate stages “N” selects from that perspective 
includes a stage-at-t that has P . Unlike “the President” and other definite de-
scriptions, names are ordinarily faux-rigid: while they refer indeterminately 
to different individuals, i .e . different stages, they ordinarily select reference 
classes from the same maximal counterpart-interrelated sets of stages at every 
time . Where fission occurs, however, the same name may, at different times, 
select reference-classes belonging to different sets of counterpart-interrelated 
stages . And where fission occurs, the reference-candidates for a name selected 
from one temporal perspective may include a stage-at-t that has P while those 
selected from another temporal perspective do not . the reference candidates 
“SliDE” selects before fission include stages that are in the pond at t2; the 
reference candidates it selects after fission do not . Previous sentences
(1) SliDE is going to be in the pond at t2,
(2) SliDE is not going to be in the pond at t2,
are ambiguous since they do not indicate any temporal perspective. Dis-
ambiguated as (1′) and (2′) respectively, however, they are not contradic-
tory – both (1′) and (2′) are true:
(1′) Before fission, SLIDE is going to be in the pond at t2.
(2′) After fission, SLIDE is not in the pond at t2.
From the pre-fission perspective, “SliDE” refers indeterminately to stages 
that are in the pond after fission as well as those that are then on the slide, so 
from the perspective of t1 SliDE will be both on the slide and in the pond 
at t2 . From the post-fission perspective, the set of reference-candidates for 
“SliDE” does not include stages that are in the pond after fission, so from 
that perspective (2) is true . there is no class of reference candidates that 
both includes and does not include a stage-at-t2 in the pond, so there is no 
temporal perspective from which both (1) and (2) are true and, therefore, 
no contradiction . likewise, in the story of personal fission, before fission, 
Smith-Jones is in Bed B before fission but afterwards she is not in Bed B be-
fore fission . We now return to that scenario in order to explain how temporal 
perspectives select reference classes .
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3. Personal fission
on the current account, stages are baptized6 and transmit their baptismal 
names to their counterparts – stages to which they bear kind-specific unity 
relations . From any temporal perspective, t, a name, “N”, selects a reference-
class from amongst counterparts of the stage-at-t named “N” . ordinarily, 
a name selects from amongst the same counterpart-interrelated stages from 
every perspective; where fission occurs it does not .
in the Smith-Brown-Jones case, j, a stage-at-t1, is baptized “Jones” and t2 
stages s-j and b-j are baptized “Smith-Jones” and “Brown-Jones” respectively . 
j transmits the name “Jones” to its personal counterparts, represented by the 
y-shaped structure:
s-j and b-j transmit the names “Smith-Jones” and “Brown-Jones” to their 
personal counterparts, represented by the branches on the left and right sides 
respectively . the name “Smith-Jones” thus selects different reference-classes 
of stages from different temporal perspectives, of which some include stages 
in Bed B on tuesday and others do not .
6 Baptism, like reference, may be indeterminate over stages, as it is in cases of posthu-
mous baptism – as, for example, when scientists baptized a primitive hominid whose bones 
were discovered in 1974 “lucy” or when historians, centuries after the Fall of Constantinople, 
baptized a geopolitical entity “the Byzantine Empire” .
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Before fission, the names “Smith-Jones” and “Brown-Jones” are not 
in use . Semantic baptism is however retrospective: the names with which 
s-j and b-j are baptized propagate to pre-fission stages – so every pre-fission 
stage involved in the fission case retrospectively inherits the names “Smith-
Jones” and “Brown-Jones” . From Monday and other pre-fission perspectives, 
“Smith-Jones” selects referents from amongst counterparts of s-j’s pre-fission 
counterparts – the class of stages represented by the y-shaped structure . Each 
of these pre-fission Smith-Jones stages has tuesday counterparts in Bed B as 
well as Bed A so:
(8) on Monday, Smith-Jones will be in Bed B on tuesday .
From tuesday and other post-fission perspectives however, “Smith-Jones” 
selects reference-classes from amongst counterparts of s-j’s post-fission coun-
terparts, viz . stages on the left branch only . the counterpart relation is not 
transitive and no post-fission s-j counterpart has a counterpart on the right 
branch . None of s-j’s post-fission counterparts are in Bed B on tuesday so:
(9) on tuesday, Smith-Jones is not in Bed B on tuesday .
As reference goes, so identity and counting go . s-j and b-j have the same pre-
fission counterparts so, at any pre-fission time, t, s-j’s counterpart-at-t = b-j’s 
counterpart-at-t, hence:
(10) on Monday, Smith-Jones = Brown-Jones on Monday .
s-j and b-j do not share any post-fission counterparts . So no post-fission stage 
inherits both “Smith-Jones” and “Brown-Jones”, thus:
(11) on tuesday, Smith-Jones ≠ Brown-Jones on Monday .
Naïve Subject is therefore correct . on Monday, there is one person in 
Room 100 on Monday; on tuesday there were two people in Room 100 on 
Monday . there are no individuals that are identical on some occasions but 
not on others . Rather, different individuals, that is, different stages, count on 
different occasions . on tuesday it is post-fission stages whose identity is in 
question and no post-fission stage is a counterpart to both s-j and b-j .
Naïve Subject is also correct in believing on tuesday that Smith-Jones 
and Brown-Jones are distinct but that each is identical to Jones . Each post-
fission counterpart of s-j and each post-fission counterpart of b-j is a post-fis-
sion counterpart of j so
(12) on tuesday, Smith-Jones = Jones on tuesday .
(13) on tuesday, Brown-Jones = Jones on tuesday .
At every post-fission time there are two distinct concurrent j-counterparts 
– one of which is an s-j counterpart and the other a b-j counterpart . (12) is 
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true because for every post-fission time, t, s-j’s counterpart-at-t is identical to 
one of j’s counterparts-at-t; (13) because for every post-fission time, t, b-j’s 
counterpart-at-t is identical to another one of j’s counterparts-at-t . But there is 
no post-fission time, t, when s-j’s counterpart-at-t = b-j’s counterpart-at-t so
(14) on tuesday, Smith-Jones ≠ Brown-Jones on tuesday .
Names of ordinary material things are, at best, faux-rigid: a name refers, in-
determinately, to different stages, and the range of stages to which a name 
refers may vary . to that extent all names are ambiguous . on tuesday, however, 
“Jones” is strongly ambiguous: it selects reference candidates from two non-over-
lapping classes of j’s post-fission counterparts . (12) is true on one disambigua-
tion of “Jones”, where it refers indeterminately to post-fission stages on the s-j 
branch; (13) is true when “Jones” refers indeterminately to stages on the b-j 
branch so (12) and (13) are ambiguous, and should be disambiguated as:
(12′) On Tuesday, Smith-Jones = Joness-j on Tuesday.
(13′) On Tuesday, Brown-Jones = Jonesb-j on Tuesday.
So (14) does not violate transitivity of identity .
the current account therefore delivers all the benefits occasional identity 
provides for fission cases without the metaphysical cost .
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